We present a model of access control which provides fine-grained data-dependent control, can express permissions about permissions, can express delegation, and can describe systems which avoid the rootbottleneck problem. We present a language for describing goals of agents; these goals are typically to read or write the values of some resources. We describe a decision procedure which determines whether a given coalition of agents has the means (possibly indirectly) to achieve its goal. We argue that this question is decidable in the situation of the potential intruders acting in parallel with legitimate users and taking whatever temporary opportunities the actions of the legitimate users present. Our technique can also be used to synthesise finite access control systems, from an appropriately formulated logical theory describing a high-level policy.
Introduction
In a world in which computers are ever-more interconnected, access control systems are of increasing importance in order to guarantee that resources are accessible by their intended users, and not by other possibly malicious users. Access control systems are used to regulate access to resources such as files, database entries, printers, web pages. They may also be used in less obvious applications, such as to determine whether incoming mail has access to its destination mailbox (spam filtering), or incoming IP packets to their destination computers (firewalls).
We present a model of access control which has among others the following features:
Access control may be dependent on the data subject to control. This is useful in certain applications, such as the conference paper review system described below, or stateful firewalls, databases, etc. In [7] , this is called conditional authorisation.
Delegation of access control is easily expressed. This helps to avoid the root bottleneck, whereby root or the owner of a resource is required in order to make access control changes, and the insecurity caused by investing too much power in a single agent.
Permissions for coalitions to act jointly can be expressed.
A key feature of our model is that permissions are functions of state variables, and therefore may change with the state. Because the ability to change the state is itself controlled by permissions, one can, in particular, express permissions about permissions. This allows us easily to devolve authority downwards, thus avoiding the root bottleneck, and to express delegation.
A potential problem of sophisticated access control systems, such as those which can be described using our model, is indirect paths. It might be that the system denies immediate access to a resource for a certain agent, but it gives the agent indirect possibilities by allowing it to manipulate permissions. Hence, there could be a sequence of steps which the agent can execute, in order to obtain access to the resource. We are interested in verifying access control systems to check whether such indirect paths exist.
Example 1 Consider a conference paper review system. It consists of a set of papers, and a set of agents (which may be authors, programme-committee (PC) members, etc). The following rules apply:
1. The chair appoints agents (if they agree to it) to become PC members. PC members can resign unilaterally.
2. The chair assigns papers for reviewing to PC members.
3. PC members may submit reviews of papers that they have been assigned. 4 . A PC member may read 's review of a paper, if: the paper has not been assigned to ; or the paper has been assigned to , and she has already submitted her own review. 5 . PC members may appoint sub-reviewers for papers which they have been assigned. Sub-reviewers may submit reviews of those papers. The PC member can withdraw the appointment of sub-reviewers.
6. Authors should be excluded from the review process for their papers.
Each of these rules is a read access or a write access by one or more agents to a resource. We formalise this example in the next section, and use it as a running example through the paper. Statements 3 and 4 illustrate the dependency of write access and read access (respectively) on the current state. Statement 5 shows how permissions about permissions are important; here, the PC member has write permission on the data expressing the sub-reviewers' write permission on reviews.
Model checking such an access control system will answer questions such as: can an author find out who reviewed her paper? Can a reviewer of a paper read someone else's review, before submitting his own? We answer the second question in Example 10.
Example 2
In health care, access control systems govern an agent's ability to read and change a patient's records [2] , whether the agent is the patient, a relative, a treating doctor or nurse, etc. It is desirable for this system to be flexible and allow delegation.
The patient may delegate readability or writability of certain data (such as her address or telephone number) to a friend.
The treating doctor may delegate readability or writability of other data (such as treatment details) to a colleague.
The appointment booking system may allow the patient to book appointments, subject to some restrictions.
Possible indirect paths include: the patient temporarily changes his address in order to obtain an appointment at a certain hospital, and then changes it back again.
The main part of this paper presents a simple language for programming access, a propositional language for specifying access goals, and an accessibility operator which denotes that a given goal is achievable by means of a program in the programming language and can be used to formulate access control policies. We propose axioms which lead to the expressibility of this operator in propositional logic and to decision procedures for it. These procedures allow access control policies to be checked and behaviour that violates them to be proposed as counterexample to imperfect implementations of policies. Furthermore, the propositional expressibility of the accessibility operator entails that implementations of policies formulated with it can be automatically synthesised. We also show that it is decidable whether the execution of a certain program by one coalition provides another coalition with temporary opportunities that are sufficient for the achievement of a certain goal, given that the second coalition can interleave its actions with the actions of the first one.
A Prolog implementation of one of the possible decision procedures for our accessibility operator (together with examples) is available on the web [8] .
Structure of the paper. We first define our model of access control formally, show how Example 1 can be encoded in it and point to some properties of our model known to be important from the literature. Then we introduce the simple programming language which expresses the procedures that coalitions of agents can use to access systems and define a class of goals that can be pursued by coalitions of agents. For every concrete system it is decidable whether a coalition can achieve a given goal of this class by running a program. We argue that the techniques developed in detail for the simple programming language can be straighforwardly extended to languages based on high-level access actions. In the concluding section we explain how these techniques lead to algorithms for model checking access control policies on existing systems and synthesising systems which implement given policies.
Access control systems
We denote the set of propositional formulas ³ built using the variables Ô from some given vocabulary È by Ä´Èµ. We adopt µ and as basic in the construction of these formulas and regard , , , and¸as abbreviations. We denote the set of the variables occurring in a formula ³ ¾ Ä´Èµ by Î Ö´³µ. 
The requirement (1) reflects that a coalition has the abilities of all of its subcoalitions . ÔÑ Ñ Ö´ µ The set of PC members is known to everyone.
Ö´ÔÑ Ñ Ö´ µ µ ª .
A PC member may be appointed by a joint action of the chair and the candidate, and may resign unilaterally:
Here and below we use definition schemata, which become well-formed formulas over È when the agents and coalitions occurring in them become instantiated. In particular, ÙØ ÓÖ´Ô µ stands for a propositional constant for each pair Ô ¾ È Ô Ö×, ¾ ÒØ×.
Ö Ú Û Ö´ µ Reviewers are known to the PC members, except the authors of the respective paper:
The chairperson may assign a paper Ô to a PC member who is not an author of Ô, if accepts. Both and may resign reviewership of Ô unilaterally, unless has already assigned Ô to a sub-reviewer:
The review status of a paper is known to PC members who are not authors of the paper, and to the respective sub-reviewers:
A reviewer may assign a paper Ô to at most one sub-reviewer , who is not an author of Ô, and has not been assigned Ô by another reviewer. (To review Ô personally, must become his/her own sub-reviewer.) A reviewer may revoke sub-reviewership, and a sub-reviewer may resign, unless a review has already been submitted: The formulas Ö´ µ and Û´ µ in 2-4 which are defined about singleton coalitions extend to bigger coalitions by monotonicity. The purpose of this example is to illustrate our model and syntax. It becomes clear in Example 10 that the design of the system specified above is not flawless. It admits violating some well-established practices of conference management.
We extend Ö to a mapping from Ä´Èµ ¢ ¾ ¦ to Ä´Èµ by putting Ö´³ µ ª Î Ô occurs in ³ Ö´Ô µ. An access control system È ¦ Ö Û is finite, if È and ¦ are finite. In this paper we study finite access control systems. We only consider systems whose resources are sets of boolean variables; for example, the review of a paper was represented as a boolean, which is more crude than the reviews from most conferences.
Comparison with other models
Several formal models of access control have been published. The influential early work [9] proposed a model for access control with a matrix containing the current rights of each agent on each resource in the modelled system. The actions allowed include creating and destroying agents and resources and updating the matrix of the access rights. The possibility to carry out an action is defined in terms of the rights as described in the matrix. Given the generality of that model, it is not surprising that the problem of whether an agent can gain access to a resource, called the safety problem, is not decidable. This can be largely ascribed to the possibility to change the sets of agents and resources in the model. In our model, the sets of agents and resources are fixed.
The formulas Ö´Ô µ and Û´Ô µ may be considered as the values of the cells of an access matrix Coalition Resource Ô Ö´Ô µ Û´Ô µ which for each particular state × of the modelled system corresponds to a matrix of the form from [9] describing the rights of reading and writing at that state. Unlike [9] , entries in the matrix are updated by actions specifically for that purpose, whereas in our model coalitions update general purpose state variables, which in turn affect the value of the formulas Ö´ µ and Û´ µ. This allows the modelling of automatic dependencies between the contents of the access control system, if viewed as a database, and the rights of its users. The special case in which every particular right can be manipulated by a dedicated action can be modelled in our system by choosing a dedicated propositional variable Õ Ü Ô for each triple Ü ¾ Ö Û , Ô ¾ È and ¦ and defining Ü´Ô µ as Õ Ü Ô . Then changing the right Ü of coalition on Ô can be made independently for each triple Ü Ô . In this case, however, special care needs to be taken to avoid infinite
An analysis of formal models is given in [7] . Desirable properties highlighted in the literature include:
Conditional authorisations [7] . Protection requirements may need to depend on the evaluation of conditions. As shown by the example above, this is a central feature of our model. [10, 1] . Some actions require to be executed jointly by a coalition of agents, such as the appointment of an agent to the programme committee in the example above, which requires the willingness both of the chair and the candidate.
Expressibility of joint action
Delegation mechanisms. In particular, permission to delegate a privilege should be independent of the privilege [4] . Delegation mechanisms may be classified according to permanence, transitivity and other criteria [5] .
Support for open and closed systems [7] . In open systems, accesses which are not specified as forbidden are allowed. Thus, the default is that actions are allowed. In closed systems, the default is the opposite: actions which are not expressly allowed are forbidden.
Expressibility of administrative policies [7] . Administrative policies specify who may add, delete, or modify the permissions of the access control system. The are "one of the most important, although less understood" aspects of access control, and "usually receive little consideration" [7] . In our model, they are fully integrated, as the conference paper review example shows.
Avoidance of root bottleneck. Called 'separation of duty' in [7] , this property refers to the principle that no user should be given enough privilege to misuse the system on their own. Models should facilitate the design of systems having this property.
¯Support for fine-and coarse-grained specifications [7] . Fine-grained rules may refer to specific individuals and specific objects, and these should be supported. But allowing only fine-grained rules would make a model unusable; some coarse-grained mechanisms such as roles must also be supported. Our model supports fine-grained rules. It relies on a higher-level language such as the language of predicates used in the example above to express coarse-grained rules.
Our model satisfies all these properties, except the last one. It is not meant to be a language for users. It represents a low-level model of access control, which we can use to give semantics to higher-level languages such as RBAC [12] , OASIS [3] , and the calculus of [1] .
Programs in systems with access control
In this section we introduce a simple language which can be used to program access to systems as we described above. Programs « in it have the syntax « × Ô Ô ³ ³ Ø Ò « Ð× « ´« «µ (2) and the usual meaning. It can be shown that adding a loop statement, e.g. Û Ð ³ Ó « to this language would have no effect on its ultimate expressive power. This follows from our choice to model only finite state systems. We do not include loops in (2), because our concern is the mere existence of programs with certain properties.
Semantics of programs
We define the semantics of programs in (2) as functions from states to states. This can be regarded as a denotational semantics for (2), as known from the literature (see, e.g., [11] ). The ingredient of this semantics that is specific and most important to our study is a mapping describing executability of programs as the subject to access restrictions. The notation below is introduced to enable the concise definition of the semantics. Let Ë È ¦ Ö Û be a fixed access control system for the rest of this section. Despite its ultimate simplicity, the language (2) can describe every deterministic and terminating algorithm for access to a system the considered type, as long as it is assumed that a failed access attempt can only bring general failure, and cannot be used to, e.g., draw conclusions on the state of a system for the purpose of further action. This restriction can be lifted. See the more general setting outlined in Subsections 4.2 and 4.3.
Programs which obtain access
Let Ë È ¦ Ö Û be a fixed access control system again, and let È be the set of programs (2) in the vocabulary È . Given a state × È and a Ô ¾ È , the truth values Ö´Ô µ´×µ and Û´Ô µ´×µ indicate whether can read and write Ô, respectively, in state ×. However, it may be that currently does not have some permission, but that can change the state in order to obtain it. In this section we define Ê ³ and Ï ³, which denote 's ability to read/write by a possibly lengthy sequence of steps. Such sequences can be encoded as programs of the form (2). The ultimate ability for to obtain the truth value of ³ ¾ Ä´Èµ can be understood as the ability of to run a program « ¾ È that works out the value of ³ and copies it into some variable Ô ¼ such that Ö´Ô ¼ µ Û´Ô ¼ µ . It can be expressed in terms of «℄ ℄ and «℄ ℄ as follows:
Similarly, the ability of to drive the system into a state where some ³ ¾ Ä´Èµ has a truth value of 's choosing, can be expressed by the formula
The universal closures in (3) and (4) express that «, « and « are runnable and produce the stated results from all initial states. Note that Ê and Ï allow for destructive behaviour of the programs involved.
Obtaining the desired goal may involve changing the state, possibly in a way which cannot undo. In the next section, we consider a more expressive goal language in which we restrict the search to programs which are not destructive. The formulas (3) and (4) determine the ability of to execute a program which would achieve the goal of reading or writing ³. Quantifier prefixes like´ « ¾ Èµ make it hard to evaluate (3) and (4) directly. However, if Ë is finite, these formulas have purely propositional equivalents, and therefore can be computed mechanically, because there are only finitely many different programs in the vocabulary È modulo semantical equivalence. Of course, the enumerating all these programs in order to evaluate´ « ¾ Èµ is very inefficient. In Section 3 we treat Ê and Ï as special cases of a more general accessibility operator. In Appendix A we describe a way to evaluate this operator, and consequently, Ê and Ï , without resorting to quantifier prefixes of the form´ « ¾ Èµ, which is more efficient.
A general accessibility operator
Extracting information and driving a system into a state with some desired property are only the simplest goals of access. One goal cannot be treated without regard for others, because achieving a goal may have destructive side effects which prevent another goal from being achieved. That is why achieving composite goals sometimes needs to be planned with all their subgoals in mind at the same time. In this section, we consider a language for describing more refined kinds of access. Our language allows us to express boolean combinations of goals. Expressible goals include preserving the truth value of some formulas while reading or setting the truth values of others. Preservation is understood as restoring the original value of the formula in question upon the end of activities, and not necessarily keeping the value constant throughout the run of a program.
The accessibility operator in this language is written in the form ´¨ µ where is a coalition,¨is a list of formulas in Ä´Èµ that wants to read, and is a goal formula with the syntax Ô 
where Ô ¼ is a variable dedicated to storing the value of Ô. Note that the program restores the value of Õ after temporarily setting it to ½ in order to gain access to Ô in the else clause of the conditional statement. The goal described by the simpler expression ´ Ô µ, which does not require Õ to be restored, can be achieved by the simpler prograḿ The program (except for the formatting) was produced by our implementation [8] .
In general, the goal ´¨ µ expresses the ability of the coalition to execute a program which reads the values of formulas in¨, while changing the values of formulas in order to make the relation represented by hold. The simple goals expressed by Ê ³ and Ï ³ can be expressed in this language:
In Appendix A we show that the possibility (for ) to achieve ´¨ µ can be decided mechanically and, if ´¨ µ is achievable, a program which can be used (by ) to achieve it can be synthesised.
To demonstrate this, we add the superscripts Î Ì Ã to goal expressions. Ô ´¨ µ (6) Example 10 For the conference paper review system, the question of whether reviewer of paper Ô can read reviewer 's review before submitting his own, may be written as: 
Some generalisations
Here we outline some more general forms of the model of access control described in the previous sections and how our results about this model extend to these forms.
Concurrent access
Now let coalitions and be running programs « and ¬, respectively. Let the individual steps of « and ¬ be interleaved. Let have priority over in the following sense:
can choose to execute as many steps of ¬ as it wishes, then allow the next step of « to be made and regain control. Let ¬ pass control to « for one step by executing the special command ×Ð Ô. Intuitively, this means that can monitor the behaviour of to the extent it can read the variables updates and take advantage of whatever access rights grants as a side effect of pursuing its own goals. Let us denote this form of parallel composition of « and ¬ by « ¬. We define « ¬℄ ℄ for « and ¬ of the form´ × Ôµ for the sake of technical convenience:
The clause × Ô ´×Ð Ô ¬µ℄ ℄ ¬℄ ℄ states that ×Ð Ô has no effect when the program run by has nothing left to do. To express this about subsequent possible occurrences of ×Ð Ô in ¬, 
A fixed « implies an upper bound of the number of ×Ð Ô statements that ¬ may need to execute in a sequence in order to let « complete its execution. This entails that, much like in the case of a single coalition accessing the system, there are finitely many ¬ modulo equivalence with respect to their effect on the system, including their interaction with the fixed interleaved «. This means that the quantifier prefix ¬ ¾ È ×Ð Ô µ in (7) can be eliminated and, therefore, Ê ´³ «µ can be calculated. The more efficient approach from Appendix A can be applied to this setting too.
Access control with arbitrary atomic actions
So far our model allows only simple assignments to boolean variables as the atomic actions. This brings the level of abstraction down and makes some natural things difficult to program. For example, consider the system Ë È ¦ Ö Û where È Ô ½ Ô ¾ and Û´Ô ½ ¦µ Û´Ô ¾ ¦µ Ô ½ Ô ¾ . Then ¦ can overwrite each of Ô ½ and Ô ¾ at state Ô ½ Ô ¾ , but can never change the values of both variables, because once one of the values becomes ¼, the writing permission is lost. Hence, there is no way to permit ¦ the transition from state Ô ½ Ô ¾ to state without also allowing ¦ to change some of the states Ô ½ and Ô ¾ , or even to leave Ë in one of these states and never proceed towards . This means that coalitions cannot be forced to maintain integrity constraints, like, e.g., Ô ½´× µ Ô ¾´× µ for all × ¾ È , keep logs, or be saved from painting themselves into a corner. This restriction can be removed by introducing high-level atomic actions instead of the single variable assignments. In this section we argue that the technique developed for assignments as the atomic transformations on system state generalise to arbitrary atomic actions. 
General knowledge states

Conclusions
We conclude by listing some problems whose solutions can be derived from the techniques developed in this paper.
Model checking (Synthesis of attacks).
Given a concrete access control system of the form È ¦ Ö Û the recursive equation (16) for ´¨ µ from Appendix A provides an algorithm to calculate the ability of a coalition to achieve a general goal combining reading and writing variables, and, if there is such ability, to synthesise a program for to achieve the goal. Hence it can be checked whether the system permits various forms of legitimate access, leak of data or attacks which can be written as goals of the form´¨ µ. In Subsection 4.1 we show that the same problem is decidable in the situation of the potential intruders acting in parallel with legitimate users and taking whatever temporary opportunities the actions of legitimate users present.
Synthesis of access control systems. Given a set of propositional variables È , a set of agents ¦ and an access control policy formulated as a logical theory about ´ µ for ¦ on systems which have their state described in terms of the variables from È , it can be decided whether an access control system of the form È ¦ Ö Û which implements this policy exists and, if so, definitions for its remaining components Ö and Û can be proposed. This can be done by developing the equation (16) into full propositional definitions of the instances of ´ µ involved in the formulation of the policy and establishing the satisfiability of the policy with respect to the applications of Ö and Û at the respective states of the system treated as propositional variables. If the policy turns out to define a satisfiable restriction on Ö and Û, any particular pair of mappings Ö and Û which satisfies this restriction can be chosen to complete the access control system in a way which implements the given policy. In Section 4 we argued that the results from Sections 2-3 can be reproduced for systems of a general form where access is based on an arbitrary set of high-level actions. A representation of the respective access operator ´ µ like that in Appendix A for the basic case can be assembled from the components used in this basic case. We proposed a way to reason about goals which involve enabling some further goals to be achieved. We also showed how to generalise the form of knowledge states of coalitions used in Sections 2-3 and thus allow to describe that coalitions know arbitrary constraints on the states of systems and that coalitions can learn from failures.
The algorithms which follow from Appendix A are not optimal. Results on the complexity of the problems on the class of all access control systems of the considered form might be practically unrepresentative, because instances of extreme complexity usually have little in common with typical real cases. That is why it would be interesting to describe subclasses which exhibit the kinds of regularity typical for real access control systems first. In the rest of this appendix we assume that Î Ö´³µ Î for ³ from¨and for ³ such that ³ occurs in , because it is always possible to simplify away the dependencies of goals on known variables. We denote the elements of¨by ³ ½ ³ Ð .
A Calculating
The ability of to achieve a goal´¨ µ is equivalent to the existence of a program « of the form (2) for the actions of , which can execute without fail from states satisfying × Î Ì and achieve´¨ µ.
The lemma below shows that, as far as program behaviour is concerned, we only need to consider programs of a special form: 
Assigning a variable Ô can be worthwhile for either if Ô ¾ Î , or if Ô ¾ Î , the assignment really changes the state of Ë and does not take Ë to a state × such that Î × ¾ Ã (this would indicate that has been awarely in that state of Ë before). Again, can be confident that the assignment is possible iff 
Successive simplifications of the formulas from¨which are obtained upon sampling variables Ô and applying the substitutions Ô℄ and Ô℄ occurring in the corresponding axiom 9 should lead to goals wherë consists of such tautological formulas, if can achieve its original goal at all. To realise whether the current state of Ë is related to its initial state as prescribed by , should be able to evaluate the formula ³ ³ ¼ ³ ³ ³ ¾ Ä´Èµ℄ Note that this formula is in Ä´Èµ, while has the syntax (5). If applying Î Ì to this formula produces a tautology, then can conclude that has been achieved. Again, successive simplifications of the subgoals of the form ³ in are relied on to enable to reach a state of Ë where this holds. We have the axiom: 
